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Abstract
We examine macroeconomic stability of a monetary economy with habit
formation in consumption. We assume that monetary authority controls the
rate of nominal interest in response to inflation and output gap. We show
that in the presence of habit persistence not only active but also passive mon-
etary policy can generate equilibrium determinacy under empirically plausible
values of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution in felicity.
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1 Introduction
This paper introduces habit persistence in consumption into a cash-in-advance (CIA)
model with interest-rate control. The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether
the presence of habit formation may alter the stabilization effects of monetary policy.
The presence of habit persistence in consumption has been confirmed in a number
of empirical studies and the theoretical effects of habit formation have been discussed
extensively. 1 Several authors have already examined monetary dynamic models
with habit formation. For example, Auray et. al. (2002 and 2005) introduce money
via the CIA constraint into macrodynamic models in which real money holdings
bind consumption. They show that a high degree of habit persistence may yield
multiple equilibria. In contrast, Auray et. al. (2004) reveal that in a money-
in-the-utility-function model, the presence of habit does not affect macroeconomic
stability.
The foregoing studies on monetary dynamics with habit formation usually as-
sume the traditional monetary policy in the money and growth literature, that is,
the monetary authority fixes the expansion rate of nominal money supply. It is now
well understood that the exogenous money supply rule does not precisely describe
the central banks’ behaviors in many countries. Rather, as emphasized by Taylor
(1993), they control the nominal interest rate by observing inflation and output gap.
Considering this fact, a large number of authors have examined stabilization effect
of interest-rate control rules: see, for example, Benhabib et. al. (2001), Meng (2002)
and others. However, these authors ignore habit persistence in consumption. Our
central concern is to reconsider the stabilizing effect of interest-rate control in the
presence of habit formation.
It is to be noted that Graham (2008) constructs a savers-and-spenders model
of monetary economy with habit formation and interest-rate control. He uses a
1For example, see Abel (1990), Carroll et. al. (1997), Carroll (2000), Constantinides (1990),
Fuhrer (2000), Smith (2002), and Weder (2000).
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stochastic New Keynesian model that includes imperfect competition, sticky price
adjustment as well as capital accumulation, and his research concern focuses on
numerical experiments rather than analytical implications. In contrast, we use a
simple model of competitive, production economy in order to consider equilibrium
determinacy analytically. Our model is based on Meng (2002) who studies stabi-
lization effect of interest-rate control in a CIA economy with variable labor supply.
We generalize Meng’s (2002) analysis in two aspects.
First, as was emphasized, we introduce habit persistence in consumption into the
base model. When the implicit cost of habit accumulation which represents a nega-
tive effect on the utility is taken into consideration under household’s optimization,
passive monetary policy which lowers the real rate of interest with a higher inflation
may easily create determinate equilibrium under plausible values of the elasticity of
intertemporal substitution. This is in contrast to the finding that in models without
habit formation determinacy under passive interest-rate control can hardly emerge.
Second, we assume that the central bank adjusts the nominal interest rate in
response not only to the rate of inflation but also to output gap, while Meng (2002)
assumes that the nominal interest rate depends on inflation alone. 2 Given our policy
rule, a rise in the rate of inflation may lower a real interest rate, even when monetary
policy is active in which the real rate of interest rises with a higher inflation. For
the effect on output via habit formation combining with this type of interest-rate
control, it becomes more difficult to hold determinacy under active policy and high
elasticity of intertemporal substitution.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the base model.
Section 3 examines equilibrium determinacy/indeterminacy conditions for the base
model. This section also considers the case with outward-looking habit persistence
2Whether it is significant for macroeconomic stability depends on a structure of the economy.
For example, Meng and Yip (2004) show that it does not affect equilibrium determinacy in the
Ramsey model, while it has an influence on stability in an AK growth economy as shown in Fujisaki
and Mino (2007).
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where habit formation in consumption is external to each household. Section 4
presents numerical examples for alternative forms of utility functions. Section 5
concludes.
2 The Model
The representative household’s optimization problem is
max
∫ ∞
0
u(c− θh, l)e−ρtdt, 0 < θ < 1, ρ > 0, (1)
subject to
a˙ = (R− pi)a−Rm+ wz − c− τ, (2)
αc ≤ m, α > 0, (3)
h˙ = β(c− h), β > 0, (4)
where a ≡ b + m real financial assets, b bonds, m real money holdings, c is con-
sumption, ρ the time discount rate, l leisure, n ≡ 1− l labor, R the nominal interest
rate, pi the rate of inflation, w the real wage, τ lump taxes, h the stock of con-
sumption habits, θ habit persistence, and β denotes the speed of habit adjustment.
The instantaneous felicity function, u(c − θh, l), is monotonically increasing and
strictly concave in c − θh and l. Additionally, we assume that both leisure and
(habit-adjusted) consumption are normal goods, that is,
ν1 ≡ u12u1 − u2u11 > 0, ν2 ≡ u12u2 − u1u22 > 0, and − (u12)2 + u11u22 > 0.
Equation (2) is the household’s flow budget constraint. Condition (3) is the cash-
in-advance constraint in which cash has to be held in advance of purchasing goods.
The stock of habits equals weighted average of past consumption in such a way that
ht = βe
−βt
∫ t
−∞
e−βτcτdτ . Therefore, the dynamic behavior of h is represented as
(4). The production function is
y = n = 1− l, (5)
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and thus the real wage is normalized to hold w = 1.
We focus on the situation where the cash-in-advance constraint (3) is binding
so that αc = m holds. Additionally, habit formation is assumed to be internal in
the sense that the household takes into account the accumulation of habit stock (4)
when it solves the optimization problem. The Hamiltonian function is
H = u(c− θh, l) + q[(R− pi)a+ (1− l)− (1 + αR)c− τ ] + λβ(c− h), (6)
where q and λ respectively denote the shadow value of assets, a, and habit stock, h.
Since an increase in h lowers utility, the implicit value of h evaluated by utility, λ,
has a negative value. The first-ordered conditions are as follows:
u1(c− θh, l) = q(1 + αR)− λβ, (7)
u2(c− θh, l) = q, (8)
q˙ = [ρ+ pi −R]q, (9)
λ˙ = (ρ+ β)λ+ θu1(c− θh, l). (10)
These conditions are standard except for the effect of habit persistence. Espe-
cially, (7) states that the marginal benefit of habit-adjusted consumption equals its
marginal cost that equals the marginal (dis)utility of having an additional unit of
real financial wealth plus that of an additional unit of habit stock. Additionally, the
transversality conditions are lim
t→∞
e−ρtqtat = 0 and lim
t→∞
e−ρtλtht = 0.
As Taylor (1993) originally suggests, we assume the monetary policy rule such
that the central bank sets the rate of nominal interest according not only to the
inflation rate but also to the output gap:
R(pi, y) = φpi(pi − pi∗) + φy(y − y∗) +R∗, φpi > 0, φy ≥ 0. (11)
In (11), pi∗ and R∗ respectively denote the target rates of inflation and nominal
interest set by the monetary authority, which satisfy pi∗ > −ρ and pi∗+ ρ = R∗ > 0.
We discuss determination of the steady-state value of output y∗ in Section 3.2. The
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interest-rate control rule (11) is said to be active if φpi > 1. In this case, the monetary
authority rises a real interest rate with a higher rate of inflation under a given level
of output. Conversely, the rule is passive when φpi < 1.
The government’s budget constraint with zero government purchases in real
terms is given by the following: 3
a˙ = (R− pi)a−Rm− τ. (12)
Combining (12) with (2) gives the goods-market equilibrium condition
c = 1− l. (13)
3 Equilibrium Dynamics
3.1 Dynamic System
From (7) and (8), we obtain
u2(c− θh, l)
u1(c− θh, l) =
1
1 + αR− βx, (14)
which means that the marginal rate of substitution between leisure l and the habit-
adjusted consumption c − θh, equals the real wage in terms of the effective price
including the opportunity cost of money holdings with internal habit, 1+αR−βx >
1, where x =
λ
q
< 0. We can also interpret that the left-hand side in (14) represents
a labor supply and the right-hand side is labor-demand.
Combining (14) with (13), we derive the demand function of leisure
l = l
(
h,
1
1 + αR− βx
)
, (15)
3Originally, the budget is expressed as
B˙ = RB − M˙ − Pτ,
where capital letters are nominal terms and P denotes the price level.
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where
l1 = − θν1
ν1 + ν2
∈ (−1, 0) and l2 = − (u1)
2
ν1 + ν2
< 0.
Conversely,
∂c
∂h
∈ (0, 1) and ∂c
∂[1/(1 + αR− βx)] > 0 because of goods-market equi-
librium (13). These properties are due to the assumption of normal goods. When
habit increases under a given effective real wage
1
1 + αR− βx , the gross consump-
tion should be higher in order to keep the marginal rate of substitution
u2
u1
constant.
Since habit persistence satisfies θ ∈ (0, 1), leisure decreases with habit stock less
than one for one. When the effective real wage rises, the labor demand increases so
that the household cuts leisure.
Using (11) and (15), we find that the equilibrium rate of inflation is expressed
by
pi = pi(R, x, h) = pi∗ +
R−R∗
φpi
− φy
φpi
(
1− l
(
h,
1
1 + αR− βx
)
− y∗
)
, (16)
which satisfies
piR =
1
φpi
(
1− αφyl2
(1 + αR− βx)2
)
> 0, pix =
βφyl2
φpi(1 + αR− βx)2 ≤ 0, pih =
φy
φpi
l1 ≤ 0.
(17)
The equilibrium income becomes higher with a rise in habit stock h and a fall in the
cost of accumulation of habit −x, and thus the equilibrium inflation rate falls when
φy > 0. Even though φpi > 1, piR could be larger than one because an increase in a
nominal interest rate lowers both the effective real wage and production. This means
that an active interest-rate control may not generate a rise in the real interest rate
with a higher inflation rate. When φy = 0, these effects via the monetary-policy’s
response to output gap disappears so that piR =
1
φpi
and pih = pix = 0.
From (8) and (15), we obtain the following differential equations:
q˙
q
= −θu12
u2
h˙− u12 − u22
u2
l˙, (18)
l˙ = l1h˙− l2
(1 + αR− βx)2 (αR˙− βx˙). (19)
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Combining these equations with (9), we see that R changes according to
R˙ =
β
α
x˙− E1{[ρ+ pi(R, x, h)−R]− E2h˙}, (20)
where
E1 =
ν1 + ν2
αu2(u12 − u22) ;E2 =
θ[−(u12)2 + u11u22]
ν1 + ν2
> 0.
Note that sign[E1] =sign[u12−u22]. Additionally, dynamic equations of x and h are
respectively given by the following: 4
x˙ = [β(1− θ)− pi(R, x, h) +R]x+ θ(1 + αR), (21)
h˙ = β
[
1− l
(
h,
1
1 + αR− βx
)
− h
]
. (22)
Consequently, we obtain a complete dynamic system consisting of (20)-(22) with
respect to R, x and h.
3.2 Stability
In the following, asterisks ”∗” denote the steady-state values realized when it holds
that R˙ = h˙ = x˙ = 0 in (20)-(22). In view of the interest-rate control rule (11), it
also holds that pi = pi∗ and y = y∗ in the steady state. We can show that our model
has a unique steady state. From (20), we derive
R∗ = ρ+ pi∗, (23)
which gives the steady-state rate of nominal interest. Combining this with (21), we
obtain a unique level of x∗ such that
x∗ = − θ(1 + αR
∗)
β(1− θ) + ρ < 0. (24)
To determinate the steady-state value of output y∗, note that (13), (22) and (24)
yield
1− l
(
h∗,
β(1− θ) + ρ
(1 + αR∗)(β + ρ)
)
= h∗.
4(21) is derived from
x˙
x
=
λ˙
λ
− q˙
q
, (7), (9), and (10). Substituting (15) into (4), we obtain (22)
as the dynamic of h.
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Since −1 < l∗1 < 0 for all h∗ > 0, there is a unique level of h∗ satisfying the above
equation and thus y∗(= c∗ = h∗ = 1− l∗) is uniquely given as well.
Now, we examine the stability of this economy around the steady state. The
coefficient matrix of the linearized system of the original one (20)-(22) around the
steady state is
J =

R˙∗R R˙
∗
x R˙
∗
h
x˙∗R x˙
∗
x x˙
∗
h
h˙∗R h˙
∗
x h˙
∗
h
 ,
where
R˙∗R =
β
α
x˙∗R + E
∗
1{(1− piR∗) + E∗2 h˙∗R},
R˙∗x =
β
α
x˙∗x − E∗1(pix∗ − E∗2 h˙∗x), R˙∗h =
β
α
x˙∗h − E∗1(pih∗ − E∗2 h˙∗h),
x˙∗R = x
∗·(1− piR∗) + θα, x˙∗x = β(1− θ) + ρ− x∗pix∗, x˙∗h = −x∗pih∗ ≤ 0,
h˙∗R = αβl
∗
2
(
u∗2
u∗1
)2
< 0, h˙∗x = −β2l∗2
(
u∗2
u∗1
)2
> 0,
h˙∗h = −β(l∗1 + 1) = −β
[
− θν
∗
1
ν∗1 + ν
∗
2
+ 1
]
< 0.
There are two jump variables, R and x, and one predetermined variable, h, in the
dynamic system so that the steady state satisfies local determinacy if two eigenvalues
of matrix J have positive real parts. When all eigenvalues have positive real parts,
there is no equilibrium paths. We call this situation ”non-stationary”. Otherwise,
equilibrium indeterminacy holds, that is, there exist multiple equilibrium paths.
Letting µi(i = 1, 2, 3) be the eigenvalues of J , we obtain the following:
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detJ = µ1µ2µ3 = −β[β(1− θ) + ρ]E
∗
1(1 + l1
∗)(φpi − 1 + φyy∗pi)
φpi
, (25)
traceJ = µ1 + µ2 + µ3 = ρ+
βθu∗12
u∗12 − u∗22
− φy
φpi
u∗2
u∗12 − u∗22
+
φpi − 1
φpi
1 + αR∗
αu∗1(u
∗
12 − u∗22)
[
ν∗1 + ν
∗
2 + u
∗
2(u
∗
12 − u∗11)
βθ
β(1− θ) + ρ
]
, (26)
5Since 1 =
u2
u1
(1 + αR − βx), u12 − u11 = ν1 − u11u2
u1
(αR − βx) > 0. On the other hand,
u12 − u22 = ν2 + u12u2(αR− βx)
u2(1 + αR− βx) and thus the sign of (u12 − u22) is ambiguous when u12 < 0.
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where 6
y∗pi ≡
αl∗2[β(1− θ) + ρ]
(1 + l∗1)(1 + αR∗)2(β + ρ)
< 0. (27)
From (25), we find that
sign[detJ ] = −sign
[
φpi − 1 + φyy∗pi
u∗12 − u∗22
]
. (28)
The key findings as for local determinacy are summarized in the following propo-
sitions and Table 1.
Proposition 1 The necessary condition for determinate (resp. indeterminate) equi-
librium is that
φpi − 1 + φyy∗pi
u∗12 − u∗22
has a positive (resp. negative) value. 7
Proposition 2 Suppose that u∗12 > 0 and φpi > 1. If monetary authority controls
the nominal rate of interest in response to inflation alone (φy = 0), equilibrium is
locally determinate. 8 Otherwise, indeterminacy could be generated.
These propositions suggest that the role of habit on equilibrium determinacy is
emphasized by the response to output gap in the interest-rate control. When φy = 0,
the effect of habit on equilibrium determinacy depends only on the form of utility
function. Hence, the result in Proposition 2 is similar to one obtained in the model
without habit shown below.
3.3 Intuitive Implication
To obtain intuition behind the Propositions 1 and 2, first remember the main results
obtained in the model without habit formation. If there is no habit persistence, the
6(27) is derived from 1− l
(
h∗,
β(1− θ) + ρ
(1 + αR∗)(β + ρ)
)
= h∗. We can derive ypi around the steady
state in other cases analyzed in Section 3.3 by the same way.
7Even though detJ < 0, all eigenvalues may be negative when trJ < 0, which implies equilib-
rium indeterminacy. Non-stationary under detJ > 0 is because of not only habit stock but also
endogenous labor. Since consumption is constant under the endowment economy, habit accumu-
lation depresses if habit stock increases, but this may not hold when consumption is endogenously
determined.
8This is because both detJ > 0 and trJ > 0 necessarily hold so that only one root is stable.
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dynamic equation reduces to
R˙ = −E1[ρ+ pi(R)−R], (29)
where E1 =
ν1 + ν2
αu2(u12 − u22) . Inspecting (29) yields the following:
Proposition 3 When there is no habit persistence, equilibrium determinacy around
the steady state 9 holds if and only if
φpi − 1 + φyy¯pi
u¯12 − u¯22 > 0, where
y¯pi ≡ αl¯2
(1 + αR∗)2
< 0. (30)
Otherwise, indeterminacy emerges.
The result is also classified in Table 2. Meng (2002) who assumes that φy = 0 shows
a special case of this setting.
We find that
φpi − 1 + φyypi
u12 − u22 > 0 around the steady state in each economy an-
alyzed in this and previous subsections is a necessary condition for equilibrium
determinacy. To begin with, we investigate the implication of the condition with-
out considering the effects of habit in consumption. If φpi − 1 + φyypi is positive, a
higher inflation rate rises the real rate of interest and thus consumption decreases,
because it becomes more beneficial to accumulate financial assets. On the other
hand, u12−u22 represents the effect on marginal utility of leisure when consumption
increases one unit. When consumption decreases with the higher inflation rate, the
marginal utility of leisure becomes smaller if u12 > u22 and thus an agent tries to
cut leisure, which contradicts to lower consumption under φpi − 1 + φyypi > 0. This
is why determinacy can emerge when
φpi − 1 + φyypi
u12 − u22 > 0.
If we consider the effects of internal habit, this process for equilibrium deter-
minacy may be violated. Habit accumulation is decelerated by a decrease in gross
consumption due to monetary policy such that φpi − 1 + φyypi > 0. If an agent
9When the target rate of inflation is pi∗, the steady state of the variable z in this economy is
represented as z¯.
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internalizes habit, he recognizes that this lowers the implicit cost of habit accumu-
lation and thus raises consumption. Therefore, when there is habit persistence in
consumption, indeterminacy could emerge even if φpi − 1 + φyypi > 0 and u12 > u22.
In general, ypi is negative, because the opportunity cost of holding money in-
creases with the rate of inflation and thus consumption falls, which equals to pro-
duction and is constrained by real money balances. Since consumption rises with the
stock of habit as in Section 3.1, y∗pi and y¯pi can be different. However, when φy = 0,
ypi becomes ineffective in the real interest rate and thus the criterion of monetary
policy is sign[φpi − 1] regardless of the existence of habit. Therefore, the difference
between the case with internal habit and the one without habit comes only from
the form of the utility function. Consequently, if the nominal interest rate does not
respond to the output gap, stabilization effects of monetary policy rule in the model
with habits are close to those established in the model without habits.
In order to clarify the magnitude of the effect from habit parameters, θ and β,
on equilibrium determinacy, we have to examine the relation among the values of ypi
and u12 − u22 around the steady state in each economy, but we cannot analytically
find this relation. We solve this problem by specifying the utility function in the
next section.
3.4 External Habit Formation
In this subsection, we briefly consider the case where the habit stock represents the
social average level so that habit formation is outward-looking. In other words, c in
(4) is the average consumption in the economy at large so that an agent takes the
motion of h as given when deciding his optimal consumption plans. 10 Then, the
Hamiltonian function is now given by
Hˆ = u(c− θh, l) + q[(R− pi)a+ (1− l)− (1 + αR)c− τ ]. (31)
10This assumption is often used in papers related with habit formation.
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Using the optimization and equilibrium conditions, we find that the dynamic equa-
tions are as follows:
R˙ = −E1{[ρ+ pi(R, h)−R]− E2h˙}, (32)
h˙ = β
[
1− l
(
h,
1
1 + αR
)
− h
]
. (33)
E1 and E2 has the same forms as in (20). Since the law of motion of habit is external,
an agent does not consider the cost of habit accumulation −βx so that x disappears
from the reduced dynamic system. Given the target rate of inflation pi∗, we add
”**” to the steady state values of key variables in the case of external habits. We
see that c∗ < c∗∗ and c¯ < c∗∗, because the following results are satisfied:
u2((1− θ)c∗, 1− c∗)
u1((1− θ)c∗, 1− c∗) =
β(1− θ) + ρ
(1 + αR∗)(β + ρ)
<
u2((1− θ)c∗∗, 1− c∗∗)
u1((1− θ)c∗∗, 1− c∗∗) =
1
1 + αR∗
,
u2(c¯, 1− c¯)
u1(c¯, 1− c¯) =
u2((1− θ)c∗∗, 1− c∗∗)
u1((1− θ)c∗∗, 1− c∗∗) =
1
1 + αR∗
.
The coefficient matrix of the linearlized system of the original one (32)-(33)
around the steady state is
Jˆ =
R˙∗∗R R˙∗∗h
h˙∗∗R h˙
∗∗
h
 ,
where
R˙∗∗R = E
∗∗
1 {(1− pi∗∗R ) + E∗∗2 h˙∗∗R }, R˙∗∗h = −E∗∗1 pi∗∗h + E∗∗1 E∗∗2 h˙∗∗h ,
h˙∗∗R = αβl
∗∗
2
(
u∗∗2
u∗∗1
)2
< 0, h˙∗∗h = −β(l∗∗1 + 1) = −β
[
− θν
∗∗
1
ν∗∗1 + ν
∗∗
2
+ 1
]
< 0.
There is one jump variable, R, and one predetermined variable, h, in the dynamic
system so that the steady state satisfies local determinacy, if one eigenvalues are
positive. When all eigenvalues are positive, non-stationary holds. Otherwise, equi-
librium is indeterminate. We find that
detJˆ = µ1µ2 = −βE
∗∗
1 (1 + l
∗∗
1 )(φpi − 1 + φyy∗∗pi )
φpi
, (34)
traceJˆ = µ1 + µ2 = E
∗∗
1 {(1− pi∗∗R ) + E∗∗2 h˙∗∗R } − β
[
− θν
∗∗
1
ν∗∗1 + ν
∗∗
2
+ 1
]
, (35)
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where
y∗∗pi ≡
αl∗∗2
(1 + l∗∗1 )(1 + αR∗)2
< 0. (36)
Table 3 and the following proposition represent the results concerning equilibrium
determinacy:
Proposition 4 In the case of external habit formation, local equilibrium determi-
nacy holds if and only if
φpi − 1 + φyy∗∗pi
u∗∗12 − u∗∗22
> 0.
Comparing propositions and tables, we again see that the determinacy condition is
close to one for the model without habits.
4 Examples
4.1 Non-Separable Utility
We use an example of utility function such that
u(c− θh, l) = [(c− θh)
ηl1−η]1−σ − 1
1− σ , 0 < η < 1, 0 ≤ θ < 1, σ > 0, (37)
where σ is the inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. If we assume no
habit formation (θ = 0), then this specification corresponds to that in Meng (2002).
As in (26) and (35), traces are complicated. In this subsection, we see only the
values of
φpi − 1 + φyypi
u12 − u22 around the steady state, which is the necessary condition
for equilibrium determinacy when it is positive.
Gross consumption function 11 and the corresponding steady-state values in each
case are
c(R, x, h) =
θh(1− η)(1 + αR− βx) + η
(1− η)(1 + αR− βx) + η : c
∗ =
η
(1− η)(1− θ)(1 + αR∗ − βx∗) + η ,
c(R, h) =
θh(1− η)(1 + αR) + η
(1− η)(1 + αR) + η : c
∗∗ =
η
(1− η)(1− θ)(1 + αR∗) + η ,
11The forms of functions are independent from σ, because we assume the Cobb-Douglas utility
function as (37).
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c(R) =
η
(1− η)(1 + αR) + η : c¯ =
η
(1− η)(1 + αR∗) + η .
Using these results, we obtain the absolute value of ypi:
|y∗pi| =
αc∗
1 + αR∗
, |y∗∗pi | =
αc∗∗
1 + αR∗
, |y¯pi| = α(1− η)c¯
(1− η)(1 + αR∗) + η .
Additionally, there exists σ˜ such that sign[σ˜−σ] = sign[u12−u22] around the steady
state. More specifically, we obtain:
σ˜∗ = 1 +
β(1− θ) + ρ
(1− η)[αR∗(β + ρ) + βθ] > 1, σ˜
∗∗ = ¯˜σ = 1 +
1
(1− η)αR∗ > 1.
We find that
c¯ < c∗ < c∗∗, |y¯pi| < |y∗pi| < |y∗∗pi |, σ˜∗ < σ˜∗∗ = ¯˜σ,
and the results of comparative statics are shown in Table 4 and Figure 1. 12
Circles in Figure 1 emphasize the intersecting point of σ˜ and 1 + φy|ypi| in
each economy, because equilibrium determinacy can hold in the areas where sat-
isfy
φpi − (1 + φy|ypi|)
σ˜ − σ > 0 around the steady state. However, we note that this
is not a sufficient condition for determinacy when habit is internal. The range
1 ≤ φpi ≤ 1 + φy|ypi| becomes broader with a rise in θ and φy and a decrease in β
and R∗, which implies higher steady-state consumption and an increase in policy
response to output gap. Then, it becomes difficult to generate determinacy when
σ < σ˜. On the other hand, σ > σ˜ is harder to hold when R∗ is higher. Moreover,
an increase in habit parameters θ and β lowers σ˜ when habit is internal, and thus
determinacy under passive policy can emerge more easily.
We substitute a following numerical example into the critical values:
(ρ, α, η) = (0.02, 1, 0.7).
Table 5 numerically examines the analytical results in Table 4. Totally, we find that
the impact of habit persistence in consumption θ on the critical values is stronger
12Since R∗ = ρ + pi∗, a rise in R∗ has the same effect as an increase in pi∗. Thus, the negative
impact of pi∗ on ¯˜σ is equivalent to Meng (2002).
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than that of the adjustment speed of habit β or the target rate of nominal interest
R∗. We show more detailed results in the following.
If φy is enough high and consumption habit exists, the steady-state value of
−φyypi can be more than 0.5. This implies that real rate of interest does not increase
with a higher inflation rate even when φpi = 1.5 which is the value empirically shown
in Taylor (1993). Therefore, it becomes harder to emerge determinacy under σ < σ˜
and active monetary policy. As for this effect, whether habit is internal or external
does not seem to be important.
However, unless habit is internal, the value of σ˜ is extremely high. This means
that monetary authority can easily accomplish macroeconomic stability without
habit by adopting active policy. In contrast, either active or passive interest-rate
control can generate equilibrium determinacy under moderate values of the elasticity
of intertemporal substitution, if habit is internal and habit persistence θ is high
enough.
4.2 Separable Utility
In contrast to other cases, sign of trace is important for whether equilibrium path
is uniquely determinate when habit is internal. In order to investigate this issue
clearly, we focus on the additive separable utility (i.e., σ = 1 in (37)). In this
subsection, we restrict our attention to the case of internal habits.
When σ = 1, we can rewirte (26) as
traceJ = ρ− φy
φpi
(1− c∗) + φpi − 1
φpi
1 + αR∗
α
(
1 +
1− c∗
(1− θ)c∗
β + ρ
β(1− θ) + ρ
)
, (38)
and the critical value of φpi such that trace is zero is represented by
φpi(traceJ = 0; σ = 1) =
φy(1− c∗) + 1 + αR
∗
α
(
1 +
1− c∗
(1− θ)c∗
β + ρ
β(1− θ) + ρ
)
ρ+
1 + αR∗
α
(
1 +
1− c∗
(1− θ)c∗
β + ρ
β(1− θ) + ρ
)
≡ A1φy + A2.
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Additionally, the critical line of detJ = 0 is
φpi(detJ = 0; σ = 1) =
αc∗
1 + αR∗
φy + 1.
Since we have already derived
c∗ =
η
(1− η)(1− θ)(1 + αR∗ − βx∗) + η and x
∗ = − θ(1 + αR
∗)
β(1− θ) + ρ,
we can see that these lines depend on β and θ. Using the lines and the fact that
A2 < 1 and A1 <
αc∗
1 + αR∗
, we draw Figure 2 which shows the relation between
macroeconomic stability and monetary policy under σ = 1 in an economy with
internal habit.
We find that monetary policy satisfying φpi − (1 + φy|y∗pi|) > 0 necessarily makes
equilibrium determinate. Additionally, the slope of φpi(detJ = 0; σ = 1) becomes
steeper when β falls and θ rises, which implies that it is harder to hold equilibrium
determinacy. Using numerical example in the previous section and R∗ = 0.05, we
make Table 6 which shows the effects of β and θ on A1, A2, and
αc∗
1 + αR∗
. When β
and θ increase, the line φpi(traceJ = 0; σ = 1) moves clockwise because the slope (A1)
is flatter and the intercept (A2) rises. That is, the area where either indeterminate or
non-stationary can emerge widens if θ is higher. From Table 6, we can also find that
A1 ∈ (0.02, 0.2), A2 ; 0.99 and αc
∗
1 + αR∗
; 0.7. Therefore, equilibrium determinacy
can easily hold when (φpi, φy) = (1.5, 0.5) in which Taylor (1993) empirically shows.
5 Concluding Remarks
We analyze the stabilization effects of the interest-rate control rule in the presence
of habit formation in consumption. We assume the monetary policy under which
the nominal rate of interest responds not only to inflation but also to output gap.
Main results are as follows.
First, a necessary condition for determinate equilibrium is the combination of
a higher (resp. lower) elasticity of intertemporal substitution and an interest-rate
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control such that the real rate of interest rises (resp. falls) with a higher inflation
rate. However, in contrast to the model without habit, this is not sufficient when
an agent takes the implicit cost of habit accumulation into consideration.
Second, we numerically show that the effect generated by the monetary policy’s
response to output gap is larger when habit exists, but whether habit is internal
or external may not produce significant differences. Additionally, in the absence of
internal habits, an extremely small elasticity of intertemporal substitution is neces-
sary to hold that the marginal utility of leisure decreases with a rise in consumption.
We have shown that determinacy under active policy and the high elasticity of in-
tertemporal substitution becomes harder to emerge because of habit in consumption
and of the monetary-policy’s response to output gap: and that not only active but
also passive interest-rate control can make equilibrium uniquely determinate under
moderate values of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution if habit persistence
is high enough and an agent internalizes habit.
We suggest some future themes for the study of stability in an economy with habit
formation and the monetary policy rule of interest-rate control type. As Auray et.
al. (2002, 2004 and 2005) show, the way of introduction of money can be important
for macroeconomic stability. We have obtained a benchmark for comparing with the
case of the MIUF. Since the timing of money holdings may play a critical role in the
MIUF model, a model of Auray et. al. (2004) with interest-rate control, instead of
the constant growth rate of nominal money supply, would be an interesting setting
to be analyzed. Introducing material capital accumulation may be also an important
issue.
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Table 1: Equilibrium Determinacy in the Economy with Internal Habit
u∗12 > u
∗
22 u
∗
12 < u
∗
22
φpi > 1− φyy∗pi D, I I, NS
1 ≤ φpi ≤ 1− φyy∗pi I, NS D, I
φpi < 1 I, NS D
D:determinate, I:indeterminate, NS:non-stationary
Table 2: Equilibrium Determinacy in the Economy without Habit
u¯12 > u¯22 u¯12 < u¯22
φpi > 1− φyy¯pi D I
1 ≤ φpi ≤ 1− φyy¯pi I D
φpi < 1 I D
D:determinate, I:indeterminate, NS:non-stationary
Table 3: Equilibrium Determinacy in the Economy with External Habit
u∗∗12 > u
∗∗
22 u
∗∗
12 < u
∗∗
22
φpi > 1− φyy∗∗pi D I, NS
1 ≤ φpi ≤ 1− φyy∗∗pi I, NS D
φpi < 1 I D
D:determinate, I:indeterminate, NS:non-stationary
Table 4: Comparative Statics
c∗, |y∗pi| c∗∗, |y∗∗pi | c¯, |y¯pi| σ˜∗ σ˜∗∗ ¯˜σ
θ + + 0 − 0 0
β − 0 0 − 0 0
R∗ − − − − − −
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Table 5: Numerical Examples (Section 4.1)
θ β R∗ φy c∗ c∗∗ c¯ −φyy∗pi −φyy∗∗pi −φy y¯pi σ˜∗ σ˜∗∗ ¯˜σ
0.2 0.2 0.03 0.5 0.6985 0.7290 0.6938 0.3391 0.3587 0.1031 13.876 112.111 112.111
0.2 0.2 0.03 1.5 0.6985 0.7290 0.6938 1.0172 1.0762 0.3094 13.876 112.111 112.111
0.2 0.2 0.07 0.5 0.6904 0.7316 0.6856 0.3326 0.3419 0.1007 11.830 48.619 48.619
0.2 0.2 0.07 1.5 0.6904 0.7316 0.6856 0.9679 1.0256 0.3002 11.830 48.619 48.619
0.2 0.8 0.03 0.5 0.6950 0.7290 0.6938 0.3374 0.3587 0.1031 12.918 112.111 112.111
0.2 0.8 0.03 1.5 0.6950 0.7290 0.6938 1.0122 1.0762 0.3094 12.918 112.111 112.111
0.2 0.8 0.07 0.5 0.6869 0.7316 0.6856 0.3210 0.3419 0.1007 11.120 48.619 48.619
0.2 0.8 0.07 1.5 0.6869 0.7316 0.6856 0.9630 1.0256 0.3002 11.120 48.619 48.619
0.5 0.2 0.03 0.5 0.7119 0.8192 0.6938 0.3456 0.3977 0.1031 4.752 112.111 112.111
0.5 0.2 0.03 1.5 0.7119 0.8192 0.6938 1.0368 1.1930 0.3094 4.752 112.111 112.111
0.5 0.2 0.07 0.5 0.7040 0.8135 0.6856 0.3290 0.3801 0.1007 4.466 48.619 48.619
0.5 0.2 0.07 1.5 0.7040 0.8135 0.6856 0.9870 1.1404 0.3022 4.466 48.619 48.619
0.5 0.8 0.03 0.5 0.6989 0.8192 0.6938 0.3392 0.3977 0.1031 4.297 112.111 112.111
0.5 0.8 0.03 1.5 0.6989 0.8192 0.6938 1.0177 1.1930 0.3094 4.297 112.111 112.111
0.5 0.8 0.07 0.5 0.6908 0.8135 0.6856 0.3228 0.3801 0.1007 4.061 48.619 48.619
0.5 0.8 0.07 1.5 0.6908 0.8135 0.6856 0.9684 1.1404 0.3094 4.061 48.619 48.619
0.8 0.2 0.03 0.5 0.7555 0.9189 0.6938 0.3667 0.4461 0.1031 2.200 112.111 112.111
0.8 0.2 0.03 1.5 0.7555 0.9189 0.6938 1.1002 1.3382 0.3094 2.200 112.111 112.111
0.8 0.2 0.07 0.5 0.7483 0.9160 0.6856 0.3497 0.4280 0.1007 2.140 48.619 48.619
0.8 0.2 0.07 1.5 0.7483 0.9160 0.6856 1.0491 1.2841 0.3022 2.140 48.619 48.619
0.8 0.8 0.03 0.5 0.7132 0.9189 0.6938 0.3462 0.4461 0.1031 1.903 112.111 112.111
0.8 0.8 0.03 1.5 0.7132 0.9189 0.6938 1.0386 1.3382 0.3094 1.903 112.111 112.111
0.8 0.8 0.07 0.5 0.7053 0.9160 0.6856 0.3296 0.4280 0.1007 1.860 48.619 48.619
0.8 0.8 0.07 1.5 0.7053 0.9160 0.6856 0.9888 1.2841 0.3022 1.860 48.619 48.619
Table 6: Numerical Examples (Section 4.2)
θ β A1 A2
αc∗
1 + αR∗
0.2 0.2 0.17206 0.98874 0.6944
0.2 0.5 0.17182 0.98885 0.6917
0.2 0.8 0.17175 0.98888 0.6910
0.5 0.2 0.10987 0.99248 0.7080
0.5 0.5 0.10711 0.99291 0.6977
0.5 0.8 0.10631 0.99303 0.6948
0.8 0.2 0.03343 0.99731 0.7519
0.8 0.5 0.02822 0.99799 0.7194
0.8 0.8 0.02674 0.99816 0.7092
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φpi
σ˜∗ ¯˜σ = σ˜∗∗
1 + φy|y∗pi|
1 + φy|y∗∗pi |
1 + φy|y¯pi|
1
10
θ ↑, R∗ ↓, φy ↑
θ ↑, β ↓, R∗ ↓, φy ↑
R∗ ↓, φy ↑
θ ↑, β ↑, R∗ ↑ R∗ ↑
σ˜∗
Without Habit
External Habit
Internal Habit
Figure 1: An Illustration of Comparative Statics
Circles emphasize the critical intersecting point of σ˜ and 1 + φy|ypi| in each case.
Determinacy can hold only in the areas where satisfy
φpi − (1 + φy|ypi|)
σ˜ − σ > 0 around
the steady state.
22
φpi
φy
1
0
φpi(detJ = 0; σ = 1)
determinate indeterminate
indeterminate or non-stationary
φpi(traceJ = 0; σ = 1)
Figure 2: Equilibrium Determinacy under Internal Habit (σ = 1)
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